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religion, color, sex, national origin, handicap, age, veteran status or sexual orientation.[Hunting] is a difficult subject to deal with honestly.  It is easy
for the humanitarian to moralize against it;  and any fool on its
side  can  gush about  its  glorious  breezy  pleasures  and  the
virtues  it nourishes.  But  neither  the  moralizings  nor  the
gushings  are  supported  by  facts:  indeed  they  are  mostly
violently contradicted  by them.
- George Bernard  Shaw,  1915
We  sportsmen  are  on the  carpet.  Many  other  groups  are
watching  us,  some  with  interest,  others  with  something
nearing exasperation.  I am afraid the farmers, without whom
we can do  nothing, are  among  these.  Our  present  position
is a defensive one.  Our critics are no more  reasonable than
we  are,  but they  tend  to  have the  public  ear.  Our  whole
situation demands a positive program;  an offensive strategy.
Shouting outworn formulas  only makes  matters worse.
- Aldo Leopold,  1930PERSPECTIVES  ON  THE  SALE OF  HUNTING  ACCESS  RIGHTS
TO  PRIVATE  LANDS  IN MINNESOTA
Steven  J. Taff'
I.  Introduction
Although wild animals are technically "common  property"  under most state laws
(including Minnesota's), their management  on private lands is largely  left to the
property  owner.  As  in many other aspects of American resource  management,  private
persons  are relied upon to carry out public interests.  Many  policy instruments  have
been  developed to effect this:  taxes,  subsidies, education, and  regulation, among
others.  Is fee hunting another useful policy tool along these lines, or is it strictly a
private transaction  over which the public ought to have no concern?
The subject of fee hunting  has received far  more attention elsewhere  than in
Minnesota.  This may be due to the relative scarcity of public lands in other parts of
the country, a lack of promotion by Minnesota fish and wildlife interests,  a lack of
knowledge on the part of landowners about the practice of selling access rights, or a
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references are listed following the text.lower demand for increased hunting access on the part of Minnesota hunters.
Whatever the case, fee hunting as a property arrangement  has remained a rather  quiet
activity for several years.  Nevertheless, the subject is perceived to be a potentially
controversial public issue, the sources of which controversy are worth  exploring  now
because of their potentially divisive nature in  the future.
"Fee  hunting" can  have different meanings for different people, sometimes
leading to inadvertent and  potentially avoidable  hostilities (see Schutt).  Here we take it
in a fairly broad sense: the transfer of a valuable consideration (money,  personal
services, a written waiver of liability) from the hunter in exchange for access rights to
private property (which  may be  limited in scope or time) to hunt wildlife.  Fee  hunting
can thus range from a simple handshake to the purchase of long-term exclusive
access rights to extensive land parcels.
We do not include here arrangements  under which the State  buys access rights
for expansion of public hunting opportunities.  Nor do we include situations in which
hunters  must pay to gain access to public lands (International Association of Game,
Fish,  and Conservation Commissioners).  Finally,  we do not examine shooting
preserves which  raise game for subsequent release.  These  are all treated  separately
under state game  laws.
The management  of publicly-owned wildlife on private lands has centered
around  hunting regulations, which control  animal population  levels, and incentives for
2habitat development, which  increases animal numbers and hunting  quality.  Hunters
and taxpayers have traditionally supported these two functions through  licenses and
taxes,  and  hunters themselves  have  directly paid for such ancillary costs as travel and
equipment purchases.  The imposition  of a specific fee for access, while perhaps not
onerous to most hunters compared to all these other expenditures,  is a very real
departure from this traditional hunter spending  pattern.
Except in cases where  landowners provide  improved  habitat, a newly-imposed
access fee entitles the hunter to no new service or product.  In  this sense,  it is unlike
other fee-based recreational activities on private lands such as guide services,
groomed ski trails,  etc.  These services were  not provided  before, so their onset is not
illogically coupled with a fee.  Hunting fees are different;  they represent the  required
purchase of a right that was heretofore assumed free.
In  this report, fee hunting will be placed in  the context of a wide variety of
societal concerns that ultimately influence the ways in which we allocate resources and
decision authority in  this state.  In particular, fee hunting is a property rights issue:
Who has what rights to land, to wildlife, to public subsidy?  We will also touch on the
relationship of fee hunting to the broader issues of public investment strategies,  the
privatization of previously public goods and services, the anti-hunting movement,  gun
control,  rural development, and environmental protection.  While this might seem to be
stretching things a bit--how could fee hunting interrelate with  all these--we will see that
the  basic property  rights issues under examination here have broad implications.
3If one wishes to learn  more about how fee hunting systems work,  particularly
from the landowner's  perspective, the best single source is Grafton et  al.  This
compilation of papers from a conference sponsored by West Virginia University  is an
excellent overview and  provides as well  several examples of fee hunting schemes  that
are viewed  (by the authors, at  least) as successful.  Most of the book's illustrations are
drawn from experiences in eastern and  southeastern states.
A companion  document for Minnesota is not available, nor is it probably needed
at present.  Instead Minnesota policymakers need to first decide whether  or not a
public presence in fee hunting is desirable social policy.  Indeed,  it is argued  later that
the truly important  set of questions center around the issue of a public presence  in
hunting itself, not just in  fee hunting.  At what stage  should government agencies
intervene?  For what  purpose?  Is fee hunting to be  an economic development tool or
a wildlife habitat enhancement tool?  Can it be  both?  Who gains from  each?
This report is organized under six headings.  First we consider several
arguments advanced  in  favor of fee hunting systems, followed  immediately by
arguments arrayed  against such property arrangements.  Next, several  legal aspects
of fee  hunting are examined, particularly questions of property rights and  public
access.  The fourth part summarizes what we know about the fee hunting market,
paying special attention to demand  and supply components.  The report  concludes
with discussions of what the author thinks are some of the important underlying public
issues and of some possible roles for the Minnesota  Extension Service.
4II:  Arguments  in favor of fee  hunting
Fee  hunting, say its  advocates, has three principal virtues, corresponding  to
three significant interest groups.  It is said to increase  landowner income, to increase
hunting access on private lands,  and to increase wildlife habitat investment and
thereby decrease  necessary public investment.  It is thus good for landowners,  good
for  hunters, and good for the public.  Let's consider each in succession.
Income:  A hunting access fee clearly gives rural landowners  an  alternative
source of income--if it is of sufficient magnitude to outweigh  any increased costs
necessary to provide the service.  Fee  income has two components:  are there
hunters willing to pay for access to a given piece of land,  and  how much are  they
willing to  pay?  There is scattered evidence from  other states that such income  could
be significant.  Jordan and Workman,  for example,  reported that net income from  Utah
big game fee hunting  ranged from $14,000 to $160,000.  Few observers,  however,
expect contract payments of this magnitude  in Minnesota.
The mere  presence of a contract, whether or not money is involved, is said to
better protect landowner  interests as well.  The arrangement gives owners  more
control over hunter access by specifying who can hunt where and when.  Hunters
who have access rights are also said to  have an  incentive to do their own policing on
the parcel, to keep non-paying hunters  out, thereby affording  greater security to the
landowner and reducing  hunting  pressure on that parcel.
A well-written access contract, aspects of which  are discussed in more  detail in
a later section,  is said to protect the owner from most liability exposure.  This  may be
5less true,  however, in Minnesota and other states with so-called  recreational  use
statues, which waive  much  landowner  liability for recreationist  (including hunting)
claims provided no fee is charged.  Many contracts,  recognizing that waivers are  not
always legally secure,  call for  the  purchase of insurance by the hunter,  thereby
reducing what would otherwise  be a landowner expense.
Access:  Hunters are said to gain from fee hunting arrangements  principally
because it gives them secure and  certain access to known territory, which makes for a
better hunting experience.
On public lands, you  can compete with increasing numbers
of insufficiently trained hunters and  run the risk of being
harried by increasing numbers of insufficiently educated
anti-hunters who have just as much  constitutional right to
be in the public woods with their horns and  human  hair-
balls as you do.  Or you can buy or lease and post your
private Shangri  La.  (Reiger,  p. 15).
Of course, it's not the fee per se that makes this  heightened  experience  possible.
Rather,  its the  contracted control over access to private  land that entitles the hunter to
a "private  Shangri-La."
The expected  benefits of fee hunting systems presume,  of course, the
continued demand of hunters for what is perceived to be a set of better  hunting
opportunities.  In  particular, the guarantee of a place to hunt--with  or without
associated habitat improvements  (see  below)--must  be worth more to the hunter than
the  cost of the fee.  Advocates  hold that it very often is, and anyway, if it isn't,
landowners will adjust the fee downward  until it is worth  it. If there is no effective
demand,  there will be no contracts written.  If there is sufficient demand,  if hunters are
6willing to pay for access to private lands, why not let the landowners capture some of
that willingness to pay?  Like any market solution, a fee hunting "equilibrium"  might
carry with  it certain  unintended consequences that might call for public intervention in
what would otherwise be a strictly private transaction.  We examine some of these
possible disadvantages in part  IIl.
Habitat:  It appears to be a widely held view among wildlife managers that fee
hunting is the best hope for habitat development on private lands.  Shelton  (p. 113)
puts it this way:
Landowners cannot be expected to make  investments for
wildlife enhancement if they cannot reasonably expect to
harvest the benefits,  either through personal  enjoyment,
enjoyment of friends, or income  gained from  recreational
enterprises.
This argument  has its origin in the writings  of Aldo Leopold.  While  Shelton, for
example, notes that landowners  might improve  habitat for personal enjoyment,  the
purer sense of the  Leopold argument  is that only if landowners  are financially
compensated will they change  management habits.2
2Even a noted  anti-hunter acknowledged that game management  designed to increase hunting
opportunities can improve the lot of the game:
I think we must own that there is  no objection [to being killed by
hunters]  from the point of view of the animals.  On the contrary, It is
quite easy to show that there is a positive advantage to them  in  the
organization of killing as sport....  I am so conscious of this that in
another place I have suggested that children  should be  hunted or shot
during certain  months of the year, as they would then  be fed and
preserved by [hunters]  as generously and carefully as pheasants  now
are.  (Shaw, p.  xviii).
7Left untested, it would  seem, is Leopold's  basic assertion that financial  rewards
are the only means to influence  landowner  behavior.  And,  even if so,  which is the
preferable financial transfer  mechanism:  direct hunter to landowner payments, or
public subsidies, or non-cash subsidies, or what?
It is instructive to examine  both what Leopold  said and the context in which he
said it. When  his ideas were developed and expounded  in print in  the  early 1930s,  the
perceived problem  was an  absolute dearth of game  brought about,  he said,  by the
prevailing view that wildlife was nature's  bounty, there to be harvested.  Leopold's
solution (p. 210):
We  must  replace this concept with a new one:  that hunting
is the harvesting of a man-made  crop, which would soon
cease to exist if somebody somewhere  had not,
intentionally or unintentionally,  come to nature's  aid in its
production.
It was to increase wildlife, then,  not to increase hunting opportunities, that most of
Leopold's  private lands recommendations  were turned.  Hunting was to be  a
management  tool for controlling game populations,  to be sure,  but fee hunting  (or
subsidized habitat development) was first and foremost a program to encourage
landowners to practice scientific wildlife  management,  itself in large part codified by
Leopold himself.
Only the landlord can practice  management  efficiently,
because he is the only person who resides on the land  and
has complete  authority over it.  (1930,  p. 286)
In effect,  Leopold was arguing that only by working with  (and compensating)  farmers
can enough  game be produced on non-marginal  lands.  (Marginal farm  and
8wilderness lands,  he felt, could be purchased  by the public, but on good farm  lands,
the principal  habitat for certain game species in some  parts of the country,
"compensation to the landowner in some form  or the other  is  the only workable
system for  producing game"  (p. 284).)
Many  argue that  Leopold's ideas are  pertinent to today's situation.  Indeed, the
Wildlife  Management  Institute  as recently as  1973 was still reprinting his  1930
American  Game Policy document.  But are things really the same?  The  dearth of
most game species seems to be a thing of the past, with the possible exceptions of
pheasants in certain farmed  regions and certain migratory  water-fowl  species (which
Leopold said probably could not and  should not be managed through  private lands
incentives anyway).  In  Minnesota,  at least, there now exist extensive public hunting
areas used by hundreds  of thousands of hunters.  (Whether  or not hunting on public
lands is in some way jeopardized  by fee hunting is explored in another section.)
The conditions faced by Leopold in 1930--vanishing wildlife and scarce public
hunting land in settled  areas--do not  hold today, in Minnesota at least, thanks in large
part to the significant public and private investment in game management  over the
intervening years.  Consequently, one might challenge the contention that fee  hunting
(or any other incentive program for game  management  on private lands) is any longer
a useful prescription.  However, fee hunting might still be a useful policy tool with
which to address current wildlife management  problems such as the declining
opportunity to hunt on private lands, if that is perceived to be a problem of public
consequence.
9More  private  provision of wildlife habitat and hunting access is also said to
relieve  public agencies of the obligation of providing these services on public lands.
This could reduce the costs of public habitat management  programs,  or it could
enable the agencies to  manage public lands for species other than those increasingly
provided on private  lands.  If fee hunting caught on in Minnesota, for example,  the
state might be able to shift management  activity away from  deer and, to a lesser
extent,  pheasants.  Management  responsibility for those  game species highly desired
by hunters would  be shifted to private landowners.
III:  Arguments against fee  hunting
Opponents  of fee hunting  can be separated into those who argue against fee
hunting itself and those who argue only against any public agency promotion of the
concept.  We  consider the fundamentals of each argument below.  The central tenet of
those who oppose fee hunting  itself is that most of the just-cited arguments in favor of
the idea are simply wrong.  Fee hunting does indeed promise additional income to the
landowner,  but at significant non-financial cost to the hunter, to wildlife, and to society
as a whole.
One concern is that fee hunting will  drive what is now thought of as a sport of
the  masses into one that is only for the  rich.  Geist (p. 16) is probably the most
apocalyptic:
Paid hunting  imposes a self-defeating deterrent fee that in
the long run  reduces the public's interest in wildlife, hands
wildlife to a wealthy  minority for their exclusive use,  and at a
high cost to the public, including violence and  loss of civil
liberties.
10Demonstrations  of big fees obtained  by Texas landowners for  hunting access can be
interpreted by hunters as negative aspects of the system.  Who, after  all, will  be willing
or able to pay those  big fees?  If it is only the rich, then hunting is in trouble,  because
the rich,  having plenty of hunting opportunity on private  land, won't be as likely to
lobby for continued hunting opportunities on public land.
Lund (p. 62)  notes that hunting licenses, too, were once viewed  as onerous
additions to the hunter's  burden:
At their inception late in  the nineteenth century these
licenses fees were an  unprecedented tax, and  political
resistance to the policy was avoided by the expedient of
licensing only nonresidents of the jurisdiction, one class that
would not register  its displeasure at the polls.  With
surprising dispatch, however, once the licensing principle
was established, it was extended to include residents.
Do these license fees  reduce hunting activity, as access fees are said to do?  Again,
Lund:
Even where licenses are freely available for sale, the
process of licensing diminishes wildlife taking to some
degree simply by reducing unplanned wildlife taking.
Furthermore,  while fees for resident licenses are  relatively
small, costs per license, or the aggregate  costs for different
types of licenses for fish and game,  may be sufficiently high
to exclude those with limited funds or with only casual
interest in wildlife taking.  The far greater fees that
characterize nonresident  licensing are sufficiently high to
diminish wildlife taking.
If hunting license fees reduce access, goes the argument,  so will the  (usually
larger)  hunting access fees being  talked about by proponents.  Implicit in this class
argument is the notion that hunting is in some sense an inalienable right afforded to
members  of society or a basic human  need that should not be  left unmet.  Society
11should intervene--or at least not promote--the exclusion of hunters  on the basis of
income.  Another  interpretation, perhaps less extreme,  is that egalitarian hunting  (open
to both rich  and poor) is a societal good either of the public good sort (provision  is
costless at the margin  and the benefits are positive) or of a merit good  (hunting is
good for participants).
Even if fees don't completely drive off poor hunters,  any increase in the cost of
hunting will reduce aggregate  participation  rates  (as measured,  perhaps,  by hunter-
days),  because hunting demand is said to be fairly elastic.  There is very little empirical
evidence on this  matter,  one way or another,  however.  Adams  et al. did  show that
participation rates for pheasants in Oregon were  quite sensitive to the level of the fee.
At the revenue maximizing  flat fee levels, over three-fourths
of the lowest income  group is eliminated from
participation... A related,  longer term policy issue for wildlife
managers  may involve general hunter  participation, as
under all schemes the number of pheasant hunters is
reduced.
Note that this study was survey-based valuation research,  not observations of actual
hunter behavior.
The political  implications of a reduction in the number of people hunting are
potentially significant.  If  fewer  people hunt, there will inevitably  be less political
pressure on the state to provide hunting opportunities on public land, to subsidize
habitat development  on private land, or even  (at the extreme)  to protect citizens' "right"
to hunt in the first place.
A variant of this lessened demand  story is that more  fee hunting--supposing its
adherents are  correct--will lead to more  privately funded habitat development by
12participating  landowners.  Better  habitat on private lands may lessen the wildlife
management need  (as  opposed to the political need) to develop habitat on public
lands.  A logical is a reduction  in  the  need for the  state to be  involved in game  habitat
management  at all.  It could content itself simply with enforcing game  laws.  The  level
of habitat development would  be determined  by the matching of hunter demand and
private habitat access.  Either way, goes the argument,  hunters lose hunting
opportunities.
Nor does every hunter or wildlife management  professional accept the
contention that fee hunting provides the proper signals to landowners.  For example,
in a study of actual fee hunting  operations,  Wiggers and Rootes  (p.  528)  cast doubt
on the notion that fees encourage  private habitat investments:
Unfortunately, it is the collective opinion of the wildlife
agencies that lease hunting, for the  most part,  has not
encouraged  habitat management  nor improved the hunting
opportunities on private lands for the average sportsman.
Presently,  its most frequent benefit seems to  be
compensation to the landowner for the privilege to hunt on
his property.
Similarly,  Jordan and  Workman  reported that less than a quarter of the landowners
charging fees  "improved  wildlife habitat or demonstrated  an  active interest in the
wildlife on their property."  (p.  485)  Consequently,  "policymakers  should  be wary of
advocating fee hunting as a means of enhancing benefits for wildlife on  private  land."
(p. 486)
Some wildlife professionals are concerned that landowners will be tempted  to
stock exotic (nonnative)  species, reasoning that hunters  will pay more to  bag a
13wildebeest than a whitetail.  Even if owners focus on native species, however, some
wildlife managers worry that the habitat will be managed  overwhelmingly for game
species, to the detriment  of other animals.  (Habitat misbalancing  is not an  accusation
unique to private owners, of course.  Many environmentalists  and adjacent farmers
contend that wildlife management  on public lands is distorted in  the  direction of game
species--especially deer--because managers need  to keep hunters, the  ultimate  source
of their jobs and  income, happy.)
Another market signal that opponents of fee hunting worry about is that sent to
those landowners  who continue to not charge for hunting.  These owners  may reason
that since plenty of hunting opportunities on well-managed  nearby private lands are
now available because of the institution of fee hunting, there is no need  to provide any
hunting access, free or otherwise, to their own  lands.  The hunting opportunity triad of
public lands, private fee lands, and  private free lands is thereby reduced to just the
first two.
Opponents also point out that not all financial flows in fee hunting  accrue
positively to the landowner.  Minnesota  law clearly distinguishes between those
recreational lands for which an  access fee is charged and those for which  access if
free.  Only on non-charge  lands does the  State waive much of the liability that might
otherwise face the provider of recreational activity.  (We  discuss this statute  in more
detail in the next section.)  The onset of liability is not costless to the  landowner.  It
must be either ignored--in which case the owner faces the  non-zero risk of substantial
damage payments if a hunter is hurt or causes hurt--or pay for  necessary liability
14insurance,  which is a recurring  expense for as  long as the owner charges for access.
A final argument  against fee hunting is that the imposition of fees reduces the
quality (in a non-monetary sense) of The  Hunt itself.  Hunters who  have to pay for
access will  begin to associate the paying of fees with the need  (or the  "right") to kill
game,  in order to make the trip "worth  it."  Diminished  in importance are the traditional
non-bag indicators of success:  camaraderie,  wilderness skills, physical challenge, etc.
As a result, the argument  continues, the quality of the hunting  experience is
diminished, to the detriment  of participants.  (Usually unspoken is  the worry that the
linking of hunting and killing--as opposed to the linking of hunting and an  outdoor
experience, with killing occasionally but not inevitably a component of satisfaction--
could increasingly be perceived by the nonhunting public as a recreational activity not
deserving of the public subsidy it now receives.)
Even  more telling is the chain of events that is said to cascade from this
increasing focus by hunters  on the kill.  Few habitats, even intensively managed  lands,
can produce enough  wild game to satisfy continued demand of fee paying hunters  for
a high  bag rate.  Rather than losing dissatisfied customers, the landowner has  a
strong incentive to pen-raise  animals and  release them on hunters'  arrival.  The
hunting experience treasured  by many is thoroughly destroyed  in  this scenario, where
fee-charging  lands become,  in effect, shooting  preserves.  Geist contends that this
"commoditization"  of game through fees threatens the very structure  of North
American  wildlife conservation: the  "allocation of the material benefits of wildlife by  law,
not by the market place, birthright,  landownership,  or social position"  (p. 16).
15IV:  Legal dimensions
While there are  many arguments of varying degrees of persuasion against fee
hunting  as a concept or a management tool, it remains a fact the fee hunting is
perfectly legal in Minnesota.  In  this section we examine a few of the legal dimensions,
particularly the assignment of access rights and of liability.
The tension between  private property rights  and public hunting access rights
has persisted since the early days of the Republic.  What exactly is it that a landowner
sells under a fee hunting  arrangement?  Since Minnesota wildlife belongs to the  state,
"in  its sovereign  capacity for the benefit of all the people of the state"  (Minn.  Stats.
97A.025),  a landowner cannot strictly be said to sell rights to harvest game.  Jackson
correctly notes, however, that commoditization  of wildlife is nonetheless inherent in any
kill, whether  or not the hunt is associated with a fee.  While most states, like
Minnesota,  make wildlife the property  of the state, this common  property is privatized
with the  kill.
When you have it in your creel or bag, it's yours....  The
'lucky' hunter converts a capital item to non-durable goods.
At the  same time, title to the game is transferred from the
state to the private individual.  (p. 5)
(Interestingly,  Minnesota law may acknowledge this privatization in a sense:  "A person
may not acquire a property right in  wild animals,  or destroy them,  unless authorized
under the game and fish laws..."  (Minn. Stats.  97A.025,  emphasis added).)
Does  the purchase of a hunting  license entitle the buyer to hunting access?
Technically, no.  It essentially permits the holder to  have in possession  killed animals
of a particular species during a specified time of the year.  (It also permits the holders
16to "be hunting;"  e.g.,  carry a loaded firearm  in  the open, during certain  times of the
year.)  The license is not properly  even a right to hunt;  rather,  it is the right to  kill
certain animals at certain times in certain areas.  It does not guarantee  either access
to game or access to hunting grounds.  As noted  above, the legal effect of the hunting
license is to permit the holder to privatize  (through the kill) what was formerly the
common  property of the people of Minnesota.
Trespass:  Early American  game law presupposed free taking.  Since "the
people"  owned the game,  no one could be prevented from killing it,  whether for food
or sporting  purposes.  Free access to game  led in many peoples' minds to free
access to the lands that held the game:
Ardent champions of free taking agreed that a common
right to enter enclosed land to hunt or fish  should be
protected  by the United States constitution.  This effort
failed....  Unwilling to mount so blatant an assault on
property  rights, other American  lawmakers achieved the
same goal through  more  subtle means:  a presumption  that
landowners welcome hunters  and fisherman to their
unenclosed lands.  (Lund,  p. 25)
This presumption took the legal form in many states that most private land, unless
specifically posted, is open for hunting.  In Minnesota,  however, agricultural  land, at
least,  is presumed  closed without  permission of the owner--whether  or not the
property is posted  (Minn. Stats. 97B.001).  For other rural land uses, it would appear
that land is presumed  open unless posted.  Despite his law, however,  it has generally
been  accepted that farmers,  if asked,  grant hunting access.  If owners want no
hunting, they are  customarily expected to post their land.
State trespassing  laws and fee hunting as an  economic activity are  not
17independent,  either in impact or in legal evolution.  Lund (p.  72)  notes that some
states (including Minnesota,  as noted  earlier)  have facilitated fee hunting's profitability
by "abrogating  the presumption that lands not expressly posted  were  open to free
entry....  Further assistance to fee hunting has  been provided by the doctrine that the
right to take wildlife may be sold in gross apart from title to the land itself."
Liability:  What about landowner liability for damages  caused to or by hunters?
The Minnesota Legislature has attempted to encourage  landowners not to post their
lands by enacting  (as have other states)  a recreational use statute that spells out
liability exposure in some  detail.  The stated purpose of the law is "to encourage and
promote the  use of privately owned  lands and waters  by the public for beneficial
recreational  purposes"  (Minn.  Stats.  87.01).  Hunting  is clearly defined a recreational
purpose,  and access fees such as those we are considering here presumably fall
under the definition of a "charge"--any price "asked  or charged for services,
entertainment,  recreational  use..."  (Minn.  Stats.  87.021,  Subd.5).
The essential purpose of the  recreational use statute is to remove  liability from
any landowner who "either directly or indirectly  invites or permits without charge any
person to use the land for recreational  purposes"  (Minn. Stats.  87.0221).  The
distinction  between charged and noncharged recreation is made  even clearer later in
the statute,  where an  owner's liability is specifically not limited for "injury suffered  in
any case where the owner charges the person  or persons who enter or go on the
land for the recreational  use thereof"  (Minn.  Stats.  87.025).
Because not all landowner liability exposure is covered by the recreational  use
18statute, owners considering charging hunters for access may  decide to  purchase
liability insurance, the cost of which might cancel most or  all of the financial returns.
Of course, if the hunter agrees to cover the costs of liability insurance  (as  many  long-
term  leases are  said to provide for), then this cost to the landowner  is avoided.
Compensation:  It is traditional in American law that the removal,  by the state's
police power,  of a property  right whose exercise led to public damages,  is not
compensable.  The state does not have to pay a paper mill, for example,  to stop
discharging effluent into a river.  The exercise of hunter's traditional "right"  of free
access  (limited only by necessary game  law restrictions),  however, generally did not
lead to public damages.  (Access can sometimes  leads to private damages,  of course,
from the predations of slob hunters.)
If  the  state more overtly promotes fee hunting,  can a case be made that hunters
have lost a right for which they should be reimbursed?  Courts would probably look
first at the hunter's alternatives.  Are there  still other private properties on which free
access is still the rule?  Are there public hunting  lands within equivalent access?  Does
the fee remove the right, or simply restrict it by being more  costly?
We can get some insight into this by examining legal cases in  which landowners
have sought some proprietary  claim over wildlife on their properties.  At least with
respect to situations in which the owners were newly  made subject to game laws, the
courts have generally  ruled  against compensation.
In  finding the aggrieved  parties without remedy,  courts have
characterized the activity of wildlife taking as a privilege
rather than a right, and therefore  have concluded that past
policies that have extended the privilege provide no basis
upon which  its withdrawal  may be attacked.  (Lund, p. 38).
19V:  Economic dimensions
Given that fee hunting is legal in Minnesota,  is it necessarily profitable?  The
answer lies of course in the confluence of supply and demand.  Are there enough
hunters willing to pay access fees sufficient to profitably cover the private costs of
providing that access?
Demand:  The base population on which to draw demand data is that of
purchased hunting licenses  (Haroldson).  These numbers fluctuate considerably from
year to year.  The  1988-89 totals were 286,000 for small  game  (up  11%  from  1985),
around 90,000 for waterfowl  (down  30%),  100,000 for pheasants  (up  18%),  and
408,000 for deer  (gun)  (essentially unchanged).  The  state's department of natural
resources does not estimate  how many actual hunters these individual license sales
represent.  Many buy several licenses, and some only one.  A rough estimate would
be 500,000 hunters,  not all  of whom will  be Minnesota residents.  That's  roughly one
hunter for every 80 acres of private farm and forest land in the state.
According to a 1985  survey  (USFWS)  41%  of Minnesota hunters  hunt only on
private lands, and  another 41%  hunt both public and  private  lands.  These,  particularly
those in  the first category, might be viewed as a potential  market for the sale of
hunting access rights if such purchases were the only way to secure access.  They
might also be viewed  as a sizeable group that,  should access fees be felt too onerous,
would either shift their hunting  attention to public lands or reduce their hunting activity.
Either case poses significant problems to public management  agencies.  If hunters
shift to public land,  pressure on existing habitat might seriously erode hunting  quality
20on public lands.  If  they cease hunting, they stop buying licenses, and game  and fish
funds, which  have come to rely almost exclusively upon licenses and fees for revenues
(Minnesota Office of the  Legislative Auditor),  could be depleted.
This would seem to argue for wildlife agencies becoming knowledgeable about
the demand elasticity for fee hunting, especially before the agencies go too far in
promoting the activity as a way of increasing habitat quality without  public
expenditures.  The actions of Minnesota  hunters faced with access fees is currently
unknown,  but it is not unknowable, given appropriate  research expenditures.
Price:  The market price of access rights in Minnesota is anything but well
established.  There appears to be little research  data upon which to draw conclusions.
Anecdotal  evidence suggests a range of from $10/day/hunter  for pheasants to several
thousand dollars for a season-long lease to  prime goose blinds.
There  are two procedures that might be used to increase our  knowledge about
fee hunting market prices.  One is to do a market  survey,  asking hunters  and farmers
what they actually are paying.  This runs the risk of underestimation,  because
landowners  might want to downplay their potential tax exposure.  A second technique
is to conduct a contingent valuation  survey and ask hunters what they are willing to
pay and/or ask landowners  what they are willing to accept.  This approach,  unless
carefully handled, runs the risk of overestimating,  because respondents might  have no
particular incentive not to lie.
Valuation techniques are fairly well established in the economics literature,  but
are not within the scope this paper.  Nor have they been conducted to a great extent
21elsewhere, perhaps because price information is deemed  nonrelevant, or perhaps
because analysts have not delved very deeply into the subject.  In one recent study,
Baltezore et al. found that North  Dakota hunters paid on average less than $1.00 per
year for hunting access.  (This average included all  hunters, not just those who
actually paid a fee.)  Adams et al.,  using a contingent valuation study to determine
hunters' willingness to pay for a pheasant stocking program  on private  lands in
Oregon, found that such a program would increase the money-measured  well-being of
hunters more  than it would cost the state.  However, only an  individually discriminating
pricing scheme  (one that charged each hunter  his or her  individual willingness to pay)
would  be able to exact sufficient revenues to support the program.
A Montana study (Lacey et al.)  surveyed landowners with existing fee access
programs.  The majority reported fee income to be only a very few small  portion  (less
than 5%)  of total  income.  Nearly all carried their own liability insurance,  and about
one-fourth  had arranged written  contracts.
Uhlig, in a survey of Minnesota waterfowl  hunting leases in 1961  found that
lease price was principally a function of how far the  hunters traveled  ("outsiders"  from
the Twin Cities paid the most) and  how much the farmer knew about the market.
More  "informed"  farmers  charged--and  received--more for their leases.
Contracts:  Two types of variables influence the  ultimate fee charged for
hunting access:  site characteristics and contract features.  Only some elements of
each  are under the landowner's control.  For example, such site features as
geographic  location (price is not necessarily inversely proportional to distance),
22landscape, and terrain  are pretty much given for a particular owner.  The owner
presumably can, however, influence  game availability and  (to an extent) game type by
suitable habitat manipulations.
Several features might be prominent in access contracts as a class, but not all
will  likely be spelled out in any given contract.
1. Written/Unwritten.  Many  access contracts have been  and likely will continue to be
verbal agreements between  landowner and  hunter.  The traditional "knock-first"
agreement  is a contract, even though it may  never be spelled out on  paper.  Many
landowners  pride themselves on this form of agreement  and value the long-term
friendships that have arisen therefrom.
2. Charged/Uncharged.  As discussed elsewhere, Minnesota  law makes a clear
distinction in liability assignment, depending upon whether or not an access fee is
charged.  Contracts might be quite formal,  even written, without a fee being required.
3.  Duration.  Three major categories of contract duration are daily ("permits"),
seasonal ("leases"),  and  multi-year or perpetual  ("easements").  There  is not always a
clearcut distinction between them.
4.  Species.  While the bulk of access rights sales is probably for a single species (or
single license, like small game) access, some have been written to permit a hunter
access to a particular property during any or all legal hunting seasons.
5.  Exclusivity.  Some contracts guarantee that the purchaser will  have exclusive
hunting use of the property during the contract period.  Others  guarantee only that a
limited number  of hunters will  have access at any given time.
236.  Enforcement.  Some contracts guarantee that the landowner  will actively keep non-
contracted hunters off the property.  Others assign the enforcement authority
(obligation) to the contracting hunter.
7.  Liability.  While Minnesota  law diminishes the liability exposure of landowners who
permit  hunting access with  no charge,  some landowners may  purchase  liability
insurance as well.  Those owners charging a fee may purchase insurance of their own
(thereby either reducing their own  profits or increasing the access price),  or they might
require the contracting hunters to purchase the insurance themselves.
8.  Ancillary services.  Not all hunting fees are for access alone.  Landowners  might
provide lodging, meals, transportation,  guide service, or game processing.
9.  Transferability.  An important feature of hunting access contracts, often overlooked,
is  whether or not the access rights can  be transferred to another party without
consent of the landowner.  If  they can,  we  should be able to find some evidence of a
"secondary  market"  for access rights.  What happens, as well, if the land itself is sold
after a long-term hunting  access contract is negotiated?  Are the access rights carried
with the land title, or does the hunter have to renegotiate with the new owner?
There is no reason to expect that access fees will settle to a single price in  the
market.  There are simply too many points of contract differentiation for a single-
price/single-commodity  market to develop.  This variability will  continue to lead to
uncertainty in the investment decisions of both landowners  and hunters.
Marketing:  In a nascent industry like fee hunting, the two parties to the
potential contracts may have difficulty locating each other.  At least three methods to
24arrange contact suggest themselves.  One is for landowners to advertise the
availability of access rights through  newspapers,  hunting magazines, yard  signs, and
the like.  A second is for hunters to similarly advertize their  interests in purchasing
rights or to directly approach  landowners  prior to the  hunting season.  A third is for
some third party--either a public body or a for-profit enterprise--to  broker a series of
contracts, either as agents of the landowners, of the hunters,  or both.  At  least one
such  brokerage firm is known to be operating in Minnesota at present.
Taxes:  Both  the landowner  and the fee-paying  hunter will be concerned about
the tax implications of the transaction.  The owner faces two significant tax obligations:
income taxes on the fee itself and property taxes from  any resulting  changes in land
value.
How state and federal revenue agencies treat the access fees paid to a
landowner by hunters depends in part upon whether or not the owner is considered
an "operating  farmer."  If so, the fee would probably be considered earned  income, so
the farmer would  probably have to pay self-employment tax on top of income tax.  If
the landowner  is not considered an operating  farmer,  the fee would probably be
treated more  like a rental payment, and the owner would  not have to pay self-
employment tax.  All else equal, then, a non-farmer  landowner could have lower
income tax exposure on the proceeds of hunting access sales.  (All else is rarely
equal,  of course.  Non-farmer owners  may be in a higher tax bracket, for example.)
In certain circumstances, the sale of hunting access rights might be considered
a service, and so subject to the Minnesota sales tax.  This is particularly the case if
25guide services, for example, are  provided along with the access rights.
The tax code can also provide incentives to the participating  hunter.
'"Tax laws have been generous in allowing the fees paid to
social,  sporting, or athletic clubs to be treated as
entertainment facility expense  if such expenses have
approximate  relationship to the taxpayer's  business and can
be reasonably expected to benefit the business."  (Shelton,
p. 225)
Fees paid for hunting access in concert with business activities might be deductible as
well, if suitably documented.
In Minnesota,  property is assessed for tax purposes  at its market value.
Lacking a large number of comparable  sales with which to conduct a market study,
assessors frequently look to the income generated from  the property.  Income  might
take the form  of crop or timber sales, cash rents, or income from other sources--like
hunting access fees.  If fee revenues become  a significant source of landowner
income  (and if they are  reported as such) then the property tax assessment might rise
as well.
An  upward  movement of property taxes might not affect two types of property
in Minnesota.  Land on which there is a "conservation  easement"  is "entitled to
reduced valuation"  (Minn.  Stats. 273.117),  regardless it would seem of the land's
continued recreation income potential.  Similarly,  many wetlands  not covered  under
the Protected Waters  Inventory  (as well  as those under the recently enacted wetlands
bill) are supposed to remain free of property taxation (Minn.  Stats.  272.02).  In neither
case is the right to hunt transferred from the property owner,  so any income from
such  properties is,  theoretically,  not to be reflected in property valuations for tax purposes.
26Whether  or not hunting fee income is reflected in property tax assessments, it
will  eventually be reflected in the land  market,  assuming that the income  is known to
the  market.  The higher the  annual fee revenues and the more  stable they are over
time (itself a function  of habitat quality and hunter satisfaction,  both at least  partially
under the control of the landowner),  the higher the potential  price of the  land on the
market.
The extent to which hunting access fees already influence  land markets is
easier to gauge  in  theory than in practice.  What analysts need is just what assessors
need:  a set of comparable properties  (similar terrain,  land cover,  etc.)  that vary in fee
incomes.  Statistical techniques such as regression  analysis can be used to make
clearer the relationship between  hunting fees and land values.  Through the  use of  a
technique called hedonic value analysis, the influence  of fees upon land values could
be further elucidated.
VI.  Political dimensions
For the state to become actively involved in the fee hunting discussion, either a
clear public benefit or clear public danger ought to be articulated.  If  fees  can be
shown to offer desirable direct or indirect outcomes that outweigh their demonstrated
costs (both on an  aggregate  statewide basis), then they might  be encouraged.  If, on
the other hand, the direct and  indirect consequences can be shown to  be  on  net
negative, then the state  might use  its power to prevent or redirect any movement
toward fee hunting.  The evidence marshalled in this document  provides  mixed
27evidence for either outcome.  While there is no compelling (in  the view of the  author)
argument that fee hunting is an unmitigated  bad, there is likewise little support for the
argument  that fee hunting is necessarily good, from  either the economic development
or the wildlife management  viewpoints.
A number  of broader policy issues cloud the debate.  As  Kellert notes,  even
hunting itself is sometimes  not the  issue:
Two  major causes for lack of empathetic understanding
between  hunters and anti-hunters  are basic differences  in
philosophical outlook and socio-cultural background.  If one
considers views for and  against hunting in detail,  such lofty
subjects become  relevant as the role of violence in modern
society, the place of the gun in human existence, the
endangerment  of wildlife and  natural habitat in modern
times, the legitimacy of continued human exploitation of the
natural world, the meaning  of death, utopian visions of
human existence, and  other proud issues.  (p.  3)
Some of these broader issues congeal into three questions of rights and  obligations:
the citizen's purported  right to hunt, the constitutionally protected  right to bear arms,
and the obligation of the public to provide hunting  opportunities.
The right to hunt.  This issue remains on the  back burner in Minnesota,
although it occasionally receives public airing.  While there is clearly no constitutional
basis for claims of such a right  (Whisker;  Lund) there  remains the fact that hunting has
gone unchallenged throughout most of the course of the American  republic.  If the
"right"  is ever widely and successfully challenged (it  already is severely limited by game
laws), the spread of fee hunting may slow down.  If hunting is additionally restricted
only on public lands, however,  then pressure on private lands and demand  for fee
hunting contractual  arrangements  might significantly increase.
28The right to bear  arms.  Few discussions about the  legal basis of hunting end
without some  mention of the constitutional right to bear arms.  Of course, this right is
no more unimpeded than are many  others, what with concealment and registration
laws, but many hunting groups strongly and actively support the efforts of such  pro-
gun organizations  as the  National Rifle Association in its efforts to combat further
restrictions on hunting arms.  If  ever there were to be a significant reduction in the
legal ability of Americans  to keep and  use firearms, the nature  of hunting would
obviously change, even if hunting itself was not challenged.  Bow hunting, trapping,
and other non-firearm  hunting techniques are not directly influenced by gun control
laws  (or the lack of them),  except to the extent that they currently compete for hunting
access with gun hunters.  If all gun hunters turned to non-firearms hunting, pressures
for fee hunting would not diminish  (for those species that can be hunted  successfully
without firearms).  However, if a significant number  of hunters simply gave up the
activity, the demand for fee hunting  (and the prices charged)  might drop considerably.
The state's provision of hunting opportunities.  One might justify the
presence of the government in the provision of some  recreation services on private
property  (like hunting)  and not in others (like  bowling)  on two broad  grounds:  tradition
and  economic.  By the former,  I mean the  institutional momentum  observed in many
government programs.  What was once perhaps justifiable for political, economic, or
legal reasons  might no longer apply under changing societal conditions--yet it persists.
An economic justification for the continued state role in hunting as a recreational
activity runs as follows.  Some elements of "the  hunt"  are said to be public goods or to
29exhibit significant externalities, both positive and negative.  Such "market
imperfections", it has  been argued,  can lead to an  underprovision of hunting
opportunities by markets alone,  because owners have traditionally been  unable to (or
unwilling to) charge for any private investment in wildlife habitat.  Fee  hunting systems
could be one alternative to the strictly public backfilling of this perceived
underprovision by markets.
Another plausible justification of public investment for hunting on private lands is
that the resulting  increase in activity has significant public benefits over and  above
Shaw's  "breezy  pleasures"  afforded the individual hunters.  More  investment in game
habitat might increase the numbers of non-game species,  as well, or perhaps  increase
the ability of the land to filter environmental toxics.  These benefits, which  clearly
cannot be charged for by the owner under current property rights assignments, need
therefore  be subsidized by public investment.
If these rationales were to be declared invalid  or insufficient, the state might take
it upon itself to significantly alter  Minnesota's present high level of hunting promotion
and  game habitat development.  As  public interests change over time, will there
remain  a politically effective demand for public provision of this particular set of
recreation services?
VII.  Where  does  the Extension Service fit in?
Two  MES  program  objectives bear directly on the fee hunting  issue.  One is
that of economic development, the encouragement  of landowners  and businesspeople
30to expand employment  opportunities through  better use of natural resources.  The
second is  that of resource protection, the teaching  (and often preaching)  of sound
resource  and habitat management.  At first glance, fee hunting would  seem a nice fit
for both objectives.  It would increase income for landowners  (presumably  many of
them farmers,  a traditional  MES  client),  and it would  lead to better management  of
private land resources  because hunters would  pay for better habitat.  Not so,  counter
some hunting  organizations.  What you're doing is simply promoting a way for
farmers--your  major clients--to get more  money from  hunters--who  don't get as much
help from your programs.
Extension  services always maintain that their activities are "educational,"  that
they simply provide the information  about opportunities and research evaluations that
allow private persons to make better decisions about their own futures.  For example,
Miller, a federal Extension  Service official,  argues that Extension's  role ought to be to
provide private landowners and managers with educational
information  and technical assistance...to enhance and
sustain productive  natural resources on their lands.  These
multidisciplinary  educational programs will  also provide
objective information on potential incentives and
disincentives,  costs/benefits,  risk/benefits, and marketing
associated with managing access...if the owner or manager
is considering  such management  as a potential opportunity
or preferred option.
Miller claims that these would not be "advocacy"  programs.  I am  not so sanguine.
Even  such a seemingly  laudable goal as "natural  resources sustainability and
enhancement"  can have significant efficiency and  distributional  implications in its actual
practice.  What really is Extension's  purpose here: to sustain the resource  or to teach
31people?  This is more  than a semantic difference.  It might happen that people,  when
"properly"  educated,  choose,  as is their right, to degrade the resource,  given the
prevailing  pattern of prices and property  rights.  Is  the education program  therefore to
be judged "bad?"
Perhaps the focus of Extension's investment  of research  and teaching is itself
wrongly  placed.  If its goal is resource sustainability, then Extension ought to focus
instead on the people who make the decisions that affect underlying prices and
property rights--policymakers in particular.  Landowners,  even though a traditional
Extension client group, are  perhaps the wrong  focus of education  programs if the  goal
of such programs is more  "the resource"  rather than people and their decisions.
In  the case of fee hunting, there  may  be a constellation of MES  activities that
will be perceived as clearly educational,  and therefore  permitted,  but there may also be
a set of activities that are thought by some  to go  beyond the pale.  This is not just a
communications  problem that can be resolved through  public relations efforts.
For example, the extension service might conduct landowner training  on how to
write  contracts with  other parties  (who may  be hunters)  or how to manage  land for
increased game  populations.  But  extension personnel probably should  steer clear of
such  activities as running a fee hunting  brokerage service, or advertising local fee
hunting rates,  or serving as secretaries of landowner organizations devoted to fee
hunting--even though  MES  personnel  have traditionally served such  roles in other
economic sectors,  notably crop and  livestock production and marketing organizations.
Above  all, the Minnesota  Extension  Service needs to carefully think about where
32its obligations to teach individuals about business end  and where an  unwarranted
subsidy of individual economic entities begins.
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